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INTRODUCTION: THE INHERENT TRADEOFF BETWEEN
PIONEERS AND IMPROVERS
The classic justification' for patents is intuitive: patents are a neces-
sary evil for combating the public goods nature of information." Unlike
tangible property, ideas can be freely copied and used by others without
interfering with anyone else's use.' In the absence of patents, competi-
tors would cheaply replicate inventions, free-riding on the extensive
research and development (R&D) investments made by inventors. Hav-
ing avoided R&D costs, competitors could then undersell the original
inventor; inventors would seldom recover their investments,4 and ineffi-
ciently few inventions would be developed. To combat this inefficiency,
the patent system rewards an inventor with an exclusive right to her in-
vention, allowing her to profit from her investment. Thus, the prospect of
a patent creates an ex ante incentive that encourages inventors to invest
more efficiently-from society's perspective-in the development of
I. Both courts and commentators regard this Incentive Theory as "the standard eco-
nomic explanation" for intellectual property. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex
Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 129, 129 (2004); Mazer v.
Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (holding that the economic justification for granting patents
"is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to
advance public welfare").
2. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Inven-
tion, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS
609, 614-16 (Richard R. Nelson ed., Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research 1962). Public goods
exhibit two key characteristics: (1) consumption of the good by one individual does not reduce
availability of the good for consumption by others; and (2) no one can be effectively excluded
from using the good. Inventions have qualities of a public good because one person's use of
the invention does not diminish others' ability to use it, and absent patent protection, once an
idea becomes public, its inventor cannot exclude others from using it.
3. See ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER S. MENELL & MARK A. LEMLEY, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 10-18 (3d ed. 2003) (discussing the public
good qualities of intellectual property).
4. Theoretically, some inventors could recoup their investments by capitalizing on a
first-mover advantage or on network effects. See id. In other cases, non-financial benefits may
provide sufficient incentives to invent. See Yochai Benkler, Coase's Penguin, or, Limur and the
Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 369, 424-26 (2002) (discussing the open source move-
ment).
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new ideas.' But this classic explanation has a critical caveat: patent rights
can also discourage innovation.' If the scope of exclusive rights is too
broad, patents inefficiently impede follow-on innovation that requires
use of a patented work . As one commentator cautions, "[d]iscourage
improvements too strongly, and you will freeze development at the first
generation of products."8
New inventions invariably rely on old ideas. While many patentees
are willing to license their rights, they are under no obligation to do so.9
This is especially problematic because so-called "improvements" often
"dwarf the original work in terms of their practical significance."' Even
when licensing is possible, improvers incur substantial costs in identify-
ing potential patent owners, determining whether their improvement is
infringing, and negotiating licensing arrangements. An improver further
runs the risk of unwittingly infringing a patent that she fails to uncover."
Moreover, overbroad patent scope can have a "chilling effect on others
who may actually be investigating how to create [a] prophetically
5. See Kewanee Oil Co. v, Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974) ("The patent laws
promote ... progress by offering a right of exclusion for a limited period as an incentive to
inventors to risk the often enormous costs in terms of time, research, and development.").
6. See FED. TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY ch. 4 at 21 (2003), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/l0/innovationrpt.pdf ("If breadth is defined too broadly-that is,
more broadly than is truly enabled-products that should be free to compete instead will in-
fringe, and unwarranted market power may result.").
7. See Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of hnprovement in Intellectual Property Law,
75 TEx. L. REV. 989, 997-98 (1997) (noting that countless economists have demonstrated that
"efficient creation of new works requires access to and use of old works"); Suzanne Scotch-
mer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and the Patent Law, 5 J.
ECON. PERSP. 29, 30-35 (1991); Lemley, supra note I, at 130.
8. Lemley, supra note 7, at 990.
9. See Cont'l Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 424 (1908).
Moreover, economic theory dictates that in many cases, licensing would be irrational because
competition from licensees would reduce the patentee's ability to charge supracompetitive
prices.
10. Lemley, supra note 7, at 997 (discussing how access to old works benefits dynamic
market efficiency in such cases).
II. There are various reasons why an improver may not come across a patent: (I) pat-
ent applications are not published until 18 months after filing; (2) researchers tend to rely on
alternate sources of information; and (3) companies in certain industries simply ignore pat-
ents. See 35 U.S.C. § 122; Wesley M. Cohen et al., R&D Spillovers, Parents and the Incentives
to Innovate in Japan and the United States, 31 RES. POL'Y 1349, 1362--64 (2002) (suggesting
through empirical research that scientists do not learn much from patents and rely on other
sources instead); Mark A. Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 19, 21-22
("[B]oth researchers and companies in component industries simply ignore patents. Virtually
everyone does it .... Companies and lawyers tell engineers not to read patents in starting their
research, lest their knowledge of the patent disadvantage the company by making it a willful
infringer... Nor do they conduct a search before launching their own product.").
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claimed invention when the inventor herself may not be able to do so.'
2
Thus, a patent system entails an unavoidable tradeoff between incentiv-
izing pioneering inventions and subsequent improvements; though the
prospect of a broad patent may provide stronger incentives for creation
and commercialization of new developments, its scope reduces incen-
tives for other inventors to improve upon that work.'"
In their seminal article on patent scope, Robert Merges and Richard
Nelson conclude that patent law should "attempt at the margin to favor a
competitive environment for improvements, rather than an environment
dominated by the pioneering firm."' 4 They further suggest that scope
doctrines should be used to optimize claim breadth, with a focus on re-
taining incentives for subsequent improvers.'"
Enablement is one such scope doctrine.'6 Arising most commonly as
a defense to an infringement claim, enablement requires a patent to de-
scribe the claimed invention in sufficient detail to permit a person having
ordinary skill in the relevant field to replicate and use the invention
without needing to engage in "undue experimentation."'7 If a patent
claim is not "enabled"-i.e., if a person having ordinary skill in the art
(PHOSITA) who studied the patent cannot make or use the invention
without undue experimentation-the claim is invalid and can no longer
be asserted. This penalty deters patent applicants from claiming more
12. Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L. REV. 123, 158 (2006)
(emphasis added). Prophetically claimed inventions are "forms of the invention that the pat-
entee did not actually invent but which would be within the scope of her disclosure." Id.
13. See Scotchmer, supra note 7, at 30 ("The challenge is to reward early innovators
fully for the technological foundation they provide to later innovators, but to reward later
innovators adequately for their improvements and new products as well.").
14. Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent
Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 843-44 (1990) (surveying historical examples in various in-
dustries to assess the effect of patent scope on the rate of technical advance).
15. Id. at 916.
16. Id. at 845 (describing enablement and the doctrine of equivalents as primary doc-
trines affecting claim scope). See Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 982
(Fed. Cir. 2002) ("[Enablementl serves to limit claim scope thus demarking the boundary
between pioneer inventions and patentable improvements."); Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley,
Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1593-94 (2003) ("[Platent claims are inva-
lid if they are not fully described and enabled by the patent specification, so the permissible
breadth of a patent will be determined by how much information the court determines must be
disclosed to enable one of ordinary skill in the art to make and use the patented invention.");
Robert M. Hunt, Economics and the Design of Patent Systems, 13 MicH. TELECOMM. TECH. L.
REV. 457, 464 (2007) ("It is clearly most important to modify the patent process to ensure that
there is a closer relationship between what a firm invents and the property rights" which may
require "modifications to patent law's ... enablement requirement[].").
17. Nat'l Recovery Techs., Inc. v. Magnetic Separation Sys., Inc., 166 F.3d 1190, 1196
(Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that the scope of the patent right must "be less than or equal to the
scope of the enablement"); In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 736-37 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (discussing
what constitutes "undue experimentation").
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than they invented and allows others to develop improvements without
fear of infringement.
Unfortunately, the enablement doctrine is in disarray. Scholars have
lambasted recent Federal Circuit decisions that apply seemingly incon-
sistent tests for determining whether a claim is enabled.' 8 These
complaints, however, are just one piece of a larger problem: the enable-
ment doctrine incorporates an assortment of moving parts, and scholars,
as well as the Federal Circuit, have not considered how these parts inter-
act as a whole.
This Note introduces a cohesive treatment of the enablement doc-
trine and in doing so, seeks to calibrate the doctrine so that it more
properly strikes the balance between pioneers and improvers. To this
end, Part I introduces the tests that have troubled scholars and highlights
these tests' apparent inconsistencies. Part II proffers a theory that recon-
ciles the tensions in the fragmented case law by expanding patentees'
obligations under the enablement requirement. This may appear to have
harsh effects, as failure to enable carries the penalty of invalidating the
patentee's claim. As I will argue, this is a necessary consequence be-
cause the alternative would expand the scope of the patentee's rights
beyond her invention, providing her with a windfall at the expense of
both improvers and (more significantly) society. These benefits justify
the proposed standard, but we need not accept its costs without mitiga-
tion.
Part III introduces and defends three reforms motivated by an under-
standing of the costs associated with the standard proposed in Part II.
First, the Federal Circuit should reconsider its approach to "undue ex-
perimentation." To be an effective policy lever, enablement doctrine must
account for an array of factual considerations which affect the ease with
which skilled persons can make and use the claimed invention, i.e.,
whether undue experimentation is required. Recognizing this, the Fed-
eral Circuit established a multi-factor test for undue experimentation,
known as the Wands factors.' 9 Courts, however, are not required to con-
sider the Wands factors. Consequently, many courts-including
subsequent Federal Circuit panels-have come to rely on just one of
these factors as a proxy for the entire multi-factor test. This shortcut
leads to outdated views of the PHOSITA and hindsight bias, which
18. See, e.g., Bernard Chao, Rethinking Enablement in the Predictable Arts: Fully
Scoping the New Rule, 2009 STAN. TECH. L. REv. 3, 1 5.
19. In In re Wands, the Federal Circuit set forth eight factors that courts may consider in
determining whether undue experimentation is required. 858 F.2d at 736-37. See infra note
37.
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contaminate courts' enablement analysis.' ° To avoid this result, the Fed-
eral Circuit should reemphasize the role of the PHOSITA and mandate
consideration of the Wands factors.
Second, the Federal Circuit should resurrect the moribund maxim
that claims should be construed narrowly when such construction is nec-
essary to preserve their validity. This maxim would allow courts and
parties to litigation to tailor claims to their proper scope as an alternative
to the all-or-nothing course of invalidation. Thus, while a patentee's ob-
ligations under the proposed enablement standard would be greater, so
too would her ability to salvage her claims in the face of a successful
enablement defense. Moreover, this option would promote a closer rela-
tionship between what a patentee invents and the scope of her patent
rights.
Finally, current enablement doctrine fails to adequately address the
relationship between enablement and later-developed technology. To
obtain patent protection, a patentee must enable the embodiments of her
invention which fall within the scope of her claims. A critical but unre-
solved issue is how to treat embodiments that become possible only as a
result of technology which arises after the patent application is filed. Be-
cause enablement is measured at the time of filing, embodiments that are
made possible only after advancements in the art need not be enabled.2'
There is no controversy here. In some cases, however, the Federal Cir-
cuit has allowed patent claims to extend to technology developed after
filing; in other circumstances, it has declined to do so. This approach
inappropriately allows some applicants to capture an invention that they
most likely never conceived and "certainly ha[ve] not enabled. 22 This
final reform disentangles the inconsistent case law and proposes policy
levers for isolating after-arising technologies which merit protection
from those that do not.
I. THE APPARENT INCONSISTENCIES IN THE CURRENT FRAMEWORK
A. Patent Claim Scope
A patent application has two main parts: the specification and a set
of claims.2' The specification describes the problem the inventor faced
20. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. It 55, 1199-1200.
21. See In re Hogan, 559 F.2d 595, 605-06 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
22. Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 363 F.3d 1247, 1263 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Bryson, J.,
concurring) (explaining his disagreement with the majority's reasoning and why he would
have held that the patent did not enable the after-developed technology).
23. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2010).
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and how the claimed invention solves that problem. It also contains a
detailed description of the invention, including how it is made and used.
24
Patent protection, however, is not limited to the particular embodiments
of the invention that the patentee actually built or those which she dis-
closed in her specification.2' Rather, the scope of the patent right is
defined by claims, which set forth the subject matter that the patentee
regards as her invention. 6 In this respect, patent claims are similar to the
"metes and bounds" of a real property deed, "distinguishing the inven-
tor's intellectual property from the surrounding terrain." 7 The claims
establish a conceptual perimeter around the invention, known as claim
scope. A defendant's product literally infringes the patent if it falls
within this scope.2'8 Therefore, an inventor would like the broadest claim
scope possible, subject to doctrinal limits, because she can thereby assert
her claim against a broader range of infringing products. Doctrinal limi-
tations on claim scope include the novelty29 and nonobviousness °
requirements which prevent a claim from covering something already
invented or an obvious extension of an existing work. On the other hand,
the enablement doctrine requires that the patentee teach the PHOSITA
how to make and use the entire scope of a claim.3'
B. The Enablement Doctrine
A patent's specification must describe "the manner and process of
making and using [the invention] in such full, clear, concise, and exact
terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains ... to
make and use" the invention.2 Early on, the Supreme Court recognized
that "some inventions cannot be practiced without adjustments being
made to adapt them to the particular context."" Accordingly, courts have
recognized that a claim may still be enabled even though some experi-
mentation is required. 4 Thus, the enablement requirement is met if the
24. Id.
25. Otherwise, imitators could escape infringement by making insignificant changes to
the patentee's embodiments, rendering patents virtually worthless. See Clark Blade & Razor
Co. v. Gillette Safety Razor Co., 194 F. 421,423 (3d Cir. 1912).
26. Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., 381 F.3d 1111, 1115 (Fed.
Cir. 2004).
27. Merges & Nelson, supra note 14, at 845.
28. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950).
29. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2010).
30. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2010).
31. 3 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 7.03 (2008).
32. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2010).
33. CHISUM, supra note 31, at § 7.03(4) (discussing Minerals Separation v. Hyde, 242
U.S. 261 (1916)).
34. See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 459 F3d 1328, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ("The fact
that some experimentation may be necessary to produce the invention does not render [a]
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specification's disclosure permits PHOSITA to practice the claimed in-
vention without "undue experimentation." 5 A significant amount of
experimentation is "permissible if it is merely routine, or if the specifica-
tion ... provides a reasonable amount of guidance with respect to the
direction in which the experimentation should proceed.!1
6
In In re Wands, the Federal Circuit set forth eight factors that courts
may consider in determining whether experimentation is undue:
(1) the quantity of experimentation necessary; (2) the amount of
direction or guidance presented; (3) the presence or absence of
working examples; (4) the nature of the invention; (5) the state
of the prior art; (6) the relative skill of those in the art; (7) the
predictability or unpredictability of the art; and (8) the breadth
of the claimS.3
Thus, in theory, enablement turns on "a factually intensive inquiry re-
garding the amount of experimentation required."3 In practice, however,
many decisions after Wands focus almost entirely on the issue of pre-
dictability. 9
Predictability is surely a worthy consideration in evaluating enable-
ment, and by extension, optimal claim scope. In its report on promoting
innovation, the Federal Trade Commission explained the relationship
between predictability, experimentation, and claim scope as follows:
When considerable experimentation is necessary, follow-on in-
novation is likely to be costly; the more stringent enablement
requirements that follow from greater need to experiment reduce
the breadth of the initial innovator's patent, and expand the re-
wards potentially available to follow-on innovators. Similarly,
less predictability makes follow-on innovation more costly;
again the more stringent enablement requirements that follow
patent invalid for lack of enablement."); In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488, 495 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
("That some experimentation may be required is not fatal; the issue is whether the amount of
experimentation required is 'undue.' ").
35. See In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac, 344 F.3d 1234, 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citing Wands, 858
F.2d at 737). But see Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1213 (Fed. Cir. 199 1)
("[lilt is not necessary that a court review all the Wands factors to find a disclosure enabling.
They are illustrative, not mandatory."). Though based on underlying factual considerations,
enablement is ultimately a legal determination. Wands, 858 F.2d at 737.
39. See, e.g., Spectra-Physics, Inc. v. Coherent, Inc., 827 F.2d 1524, 1533 ("If an inven-
tion pertains to an art where the results are predictable, . . . a broad claim can be enabled by
disclosure of a single embodiment, and is not invalid for lack of enablement simply because it
reads on another embodiment of the invention which is inadequately disclosed.") (citation
omitted); Adang v. Fischhoff, 286 F.3d 1346, 1356-58 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
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reduce the breadth of the initial patent and provide opportunities
for expanded follow-on rewards. These results are in line with
the economic reasoning for settings in which initial innovation is
inexpensive and follow-on innovation is costly ...."
But by focusing fundamentally on predictability, the Federal Circuit has
seemingly established multiple enablement standards which it has failed
to reconcile.
C. An Assortment ofArticulations
Commentators have identified as many as three separate enablement
standards applied by the Federal Circuit: (i) the "full scope rule"; (2) the
"single embodiment rule"; and (3) the "blended rule."4 ' This section lays
out the contours of these standards and highlights their apparent incon-
sistencies.
1. The Full Scope Rule
Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad exemplifies the full scope rule,
which requires that the specification enable "one of ordinary skill in the
art to practice the full scope of the claimed invention" without undue
experimentation.4 ' Liebel's claims were drawn to a front-loading fluid
injector system with a replaceable syringe capable of withstanding high
pressure. The specification disclosed an injector with a pressure jacket,
but the asserted claims had no pressure jacket limitation. Meanwhile,
Medrad developed an improved injector system that functioned without
a pressure jacket. At the district court and on appeal at the Federal Cir-
cuit, Medrad proposed a narrow claim construction, arguing that if
construed broadly to encompass jacketless embodiments, the claims
would be invalid for lack of enablement. Citing Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
the Federal Circuit refused to adopt the narrower construction,
40. FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 6, ch. 4, at 24.
41. See Chao, supra note 18, at i 21-32; Sean B. Seymore, The Enablemtent Pendulum
Swings Back, 6 Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PRoP. 278, 280, 284 (discussing "single embodiment"
and "full scope" enablement). Bernard Chao identifies three tests: (I) the "single embodiment
rule"; (2) the "full scope rule"; and (3) the "blended rule." See Chao, supra note 18, at $ 51-
52. For the sake of consistency, I borrow Chao's terminology. Chao also identifies a fourth
test, the "Wands rule," which is discussed supra Part I.B. and infra Part I11.
42. 481 F.3d 1373, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Liebel-Flarsheim is the first in a line of re-
cent Federal Circuit enablement decisions that focus on whether the "full scope" of a claim
was enabled. This approach was adopted in Automotive Technologies International, Inc. v.
BMW of North Anerica, 501 F.3d 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2007), and Sitrick v. Dreantworks, LLC.,
516 F.3d 993 (Fed. Cir. 2008). These three decisions trace their doctrinal lineage to AK Steel
Corp. i Sollac, in which the Federal Circuit held that "the applicant's specification must en-
able one of ordinary skill in the art to practice the full scope of the claimed invention." 344
F.3d 1234, 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (emphasis added).
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determining that a court could only construe claims to preserve validity
after exhausting all other tools for claim construction.43 After accepting
Liebel's broader construction, the Federal Circuit held the claims invalid
for failure to enable a fluid injector without a pressure jacket. This deci-
sion turned largely on three findings: (1) the application described only
an injector system with a pressure jacket and provided no guidance on
how to implement a jacketless system; (2) by the inventors' own admis-
sion, they were unable to produce a jacketless system; and (3) the
specification disparaged jacketless systems, calling them "expensive and
therefore impractical.""
Citing Spectra-Physics, Inc. v. Coherent, Inc. and Engel Industries,
Inc. v. Lockformer Co., Liebel argued that by enabling one mode of mak-
ing and using the invention-the jacketed embodiment-it satisfied the
enablement requirement and "the inquiry should end there.",4' The Fed-
eral Circuit distinguished the cited cases, however, as ones in which
disclosure of one embodiment allowed one skilled in the art to make and
use the invention as broadly as it was claimed. In those cases, the court
claimed, the specification did not need to "describe how to make and use
every embodiment of the invention 'because the artisan's knowledge of
the prior art and routine experimentation [could] fill in the gaps.'6
Thus, the full scope rule requires a patentee to disclose enough for a
PHOSITA to practice all of a claim's embodiments using her skill,
knowledge of the art, and routine experimentation. 7
2. The Single Embodiment Rule:
Enabling Just One Embodiment is Sufficient
The single embodiment rule's origins have been traced to Engel In-
dustries, Inc. v. Lockformer Co., in which the court's principal concern
was whether the patentee satisfied the best mode requirement. 8 In an
attempt to distinguish the best mode and enablement requirements, the
court stated that "[t]he enablement requirement is met if the description
enables any mode of making and using the claimed invention." 9 As one
commentator put it, "if Engel stood by itself, it probably could be over-
43. Phillips v. AWH Corp.,415 F.3d 1303, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
44. Liebel-Flarsheim, 481 F.3d at 1379.
45. Id. See also infra Parts I.C.2 & I.C.3 (discussing Engel and Spectra-Physics).
46. Liebel-Flarsheim, 481 F.3d at 1380.
47. The full scope rule thereby contemplates the Wands factors for undue experimenta-
tion.
48. 946 F.2d 1528 (Fed. Circ. 1991). See Chao, supra note 18, at 28 (tracing the ori-
gins of the single embodiment rule).
49. Engel, 946 F.2d at 1533 (emphasis added).
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looked as a poorly considered outlier," but several subsequent Federal
Circuit decisions have cited Engel for the above rule. 0
In Johns Hopkins University v. CellPro, Inc., the claimed technology
was a genus of monoclonal antibodies which bind to a particular anti-
gen.' The district court found Johns Hopkins' patent enabled on
summary judgment) 2 Before the Federal Circuit, CellPro argued that the
broad genus of claimed antibodies was not enabled because the specifi-
cation disclosed only the means for producing the preferred antibody."
CellPro further contended that no one ever succeeded in making a nar-
rower class of antibodies using either of the alternative methods
disclosed in the specification.5' Quoting Engel, the Federal Circuit re-
jected the second argument "because the enablement requirement is met
if the description enables any mode of making and using the invention."5
Thus, CellPro could only establish non-enablement by showing that
none of the disclosed modes were sufficiently enabled. '6 Curiously, the
court never addressed CellPro's first contention-that the broad genus
claim was not enabled by disclosure of a single embodiment. The failure
to recognize this argument is especially puzzling because the Federal
Circuit quoted one of its previous decisions for the proposition that "the
specification of a patent must teach those skilled in the art how to make
and use the full scope of the claimed invention without undue experi-
mentation.,,57 Thus, in this case, the Federal Circuit recited both the
single embodiment and full scope rules but seemingly applied one and
ignored the other.
The outcome of Invitrogen Corp. v. Clonetech Labs, Inc.'8 is simi-
larly perplexing. Defendant Clonetech argued that the claims-which
were drawn to a genetically engineered reverse transcriptase (RT)-were
not enabled because the applicant disclosed only one method of produc-
ing the RT. 9 As in CelIPro, the Federal Circuit recited the full scope
50. Chao, supra note 18, at 29. See, e.g., CMFT, Inc. v. Yieldup Int'l Corp., 349 F.3d
1333, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313,
1335 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Johns Hopkins Univ. v. CellPro, Inc., 152 F.3d 1342, 1361 (Fed. Cir.
1998).
5I. 152 F.3d at 1342.
52. Id. at 1358.
53. Id. at 1359.
54. Id. at 1361.
55. Id.
56. Id. ("CellPro can carry its burden only by showing that all of the disclosed alterna-
tive modes are insufficient to enable the claims.").
57. Id. at 1359 (emphasis added) (quoting Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 108
F3d 1361, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
58. 429 F.3d 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
59. Id. at 1070. Clonetech produced RT by point mutation and argued that the specifica-
tion only disclosed how to make RT using deletion mutation. Id.
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ruleW° before applying the single embodiment test and finding the claims
enabled."'
One way to understand Invitrogen is to view the single embodiment
rule as limited to species claims that are drawn to a particular composi-
tion of matter.6 Species claims are those that cover only one entity. The
claim in Invitrogen would traditionally be considered a species claim
since it is drawn to a single entity: genetically engineered RT.63 If a claim
is understood to cover a single entity, its scope therefore contains only
one embodiment. Consequently, adequate disclosure of "any mode of
making and using" that one embodiment-which is the "invention"-
enables the PHOSITA to practice the full scope of the claim. From this
standpoint, the "single embodiment" rule seems rather innocuous. But is
it really? As Jeffrey Lefstin explains, "there is no such thing as a 'spe-
cies' claim, for claims are never restricted to a physical entity. Insofar as
both genus and species are abstractions, the difference between the two
is less in kind and more in degree."' Invitrogen and CellPro indicate that
at least some embodiments of the invention-those made by an alternate
process-need not be enabled.
60. Id. ("Section 112 requires that the patent specification enable 'those skilled in the
art to make and use the full scope of the claimed invention.' ") (citations omitted).
61. Id. at 1071 ("The enablement requirement is met if the description enables any
mode of making and using the claimed invention.") (quoting CelIPro, 152 F.3d at 1361).
62. This interpretation brings the single embodiment rule in line with pre-Federal Cir-
cuit case law. See Schering Corp. v. Gilbert, 153 F.2d 428 (2d Cir. 1946); Maurer v.
Dickerson, 113 F. 870, 874 (3d Cir. 1902) ("[T]he claim is not restricted to the product made
by the described process, but covers the chemical individual, however produced.") (emphasis
added).
63. But see Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Formal Structure of Patent Law and the Limits of
Enablemnent, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1141, 1169 (2008) (explaining that "essentially all
patent claims.., are genus claims").
64. Id. at 1169-70. Lefstin illustrates this point with a hypothetical claim to a chair:
Consider a simple claim to a chair having four legs:
1. An object for supporting a human bod; comprising a substantially flat surface
sized to accomnmodate a human posterior, and four legs supporting said surface.
This claim is unremarkable and, supposing the inventor to be the first to conceive of
the idea of a chair with four legs, we would not think this claim poses any issue of
adequate disclosure. Yet this claim, even more so than the typical chemistry or bio-
technology claim, covers an infinite variety of embodiments. Like nearly all patent
claims, this claim is written in the so-called 'open' format, employing the word
"comprising." Such claims are construed to cover all things that possess the recited
properties. Subject matter with additional properties or elements still falls within
the scope of the claim, so long as it retains those properties recited by the claim.
Thus chairs made of all sorts of materials, chairs of all sizes, chairs including con-
toured backrests, and chairs with roller wheels, etc. are all within the claim so long
as they possess the recited flat surface and four legs.
Id. (citations omitted).
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Consider the facts of Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc.65
Amgen's claims were drawn to the protein erythropoietein (EPO). EPO
occurs naturally in humans and controls the formation of red blood cells
in bone marrow." Amgen isolated the gene that produces EPO and used
traditional recombinant DNA technology to generate large amounts of
EPO, which is useful in treating anemia. 7 Based on its disclosure of this
technique, Amgen's claims were construed to encompass "non-naturally
occurring EPO."5 If we treat "non-naturally occurring EPO" as a species
within the genus of all "EPO" or even "all proteins," it is tempting to
view the claim to cover just one embodiment: the composition of matter
consisting of the protein EPO. 69 Thus, teaching the PHOSITA to make
EPO-the claim's single embodiment-would be sufficient to enable the
entire claim. Consequently, though the defendant used a different
method to produce EPO, this did not demonstrate that Amgen failed to
enable a claimed embodiment; the defendant merely used an alternative
mode to reach the enabled embodiment-EPO.
Yet, not all EPO is the same. Amgen's technique for producing EPO
used Chinese hamster ovarian host cells. This technique resulted in EPO
with "the same or similar amino acid sequences and biological proper-
ties" as EPO produced from human cells but "differ[ed] in its
'glycosylation,' i.e., [] the patterns of branched carbohydrate chains that
attach to the protein."7° Differences in protein glycosylation are not triv-
ial. 7 Thus, Amgen's claim is more properly understood as a genus claim
that encompasses a range of non-naturally occurring EPO. Judge
Clevenger took this position in his dissent:
It is black-letter law ... that disclosure of one or two species
may not enable a broad genus under these circumstances.... At
the very least .... [this] raises questions of its enablement, and I
65. 314 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
66. Id. at 1319.
67. Id. at 1321.
68. Id. at 1322.
69. The Federal Circuit's analysis of the claims suggests that this was its view. See id.
at 1329. ("By limiting its claims [to non-naturally occurring EPO], Amgen simply avoids
claiming specific subject matter that would be unpatentable under § 101"). Section 101 has
been interpreted to preclude the patentability of natural phenomena. See Parke-Davis & Co. v.
H.K. Mulford & Co., 189 F 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1911), aff'd, 196 F 496 (2d Cir. 1912) (holding that
an extracted, purified form of adrenaline was patentable as different from the non-patentable
compound that existed in nature). Thus, the court suggests that but for Section 101, Amgen
would be entitled to the protein EPO.
70. Amgen, Inc., 314 F.3d at 1321-22.
71. See Kurt Drickamer & Maureen E. Taylor, Evolving Views of Protein Glycosylation,
23 TRENDS IN BIOCHEM. SCI. 321, 323 (1998) ("Studies of the effects of glycosylation on
protein structure and function suggest that glycosylation can affect the behaviour of pro-
teins.").
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cannot agree that the district court chose correctly by ignoring
those questions altogether. 2
The defendant used an "innovative" process to create its EPO from
human cells73 and thereby produced an embodiment that differed in gly-
cosylation from that produced by Amgen. The majority, however, never
considered whether Amgen's disclosure enabled the PHOSITA to pro-
74duce the defendant's embodiment. Similarly, the Invitrogen court never
considered whether the patent enabled point-mutated RT (the defen-
dant's embodiment). 7- The conflict between Judge Clevenger and the
Amgen majority exemplifies the predicament of the single embodiment
rule: it seemingly relies on the traditional notion that species claims
cover merely one entity. Thus, Amgen was granted exclusive rights to all
"subsequent synthetic EPO molecules without having to enable the sub-
,,76genera of molecules made by different synthetic processes.
3. The Blended Rule
In Spectra-Physics, Inc. v. Coherent, Inc., the Federal Circuit's main
concern was whether the patentee satisfied § l12's best mode require-
ment.77 After affirming the district court's finding of invalidity for failure
to disclose the best mode, the Federal Circuit considered lack of enable-
ment as an alternative basis for invalidity.' In doing so, it set forth yet
another test for enablement:
72. Amngen Inc., 314 F.3d at 1360 (Clevenger, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
73. See id. at 1325 (explaining that the defendant's process uses homologous recombi-
nation to take "the ordinarily unexpressed endogenous (or 'native') EPO gene in human cells
and transfects 'a viral promoter and certain other DNA' that does not encode EPO"). This
technology did not exist at the time of filing.
74. Indeed it appears that Amgen could not have enabled the defendant's embodiment
because it required use of a technology that was not in existence when Amgen filed its patent
application. See id. at 1335 (describing defendant's endogenous activation technology as
"later-developed").
75. Invitrogen Corp. v. Clonetech Labs, Inc., 429 F.3d 1052, 1070 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
76. Lefstin, supra note 63, at 1172.
77. Spectra-Physics, Inc. v. Coherent, Inc., 827 F.2d 1524, 1529 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
78. I agree with Bernard Chao's observation that the Federal Circuit's non-enablement
basis for reversal is likely dicta:
In Spectra-Physics, the Court upheld the district court's invalidity finding on the al-
ternative ground of failing to disclose the best mode. Arguably, this makes the
decision reversing the enablement finding dicta. However, the Court expressly dis-
cussed its decision on enablement as a holding.
Chao, supra note 18, at 27 n.39 (citations omitted). See also Pierre N. Leval, Judging Under
the Constitution: Dicta About Dicta, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1249, 1257 (2006) (noting that "dic-
tum is not converted into holding by forceful utterance, or by preceding it with the words 'We
hold that .. "').
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If an invention pertains to an art where the results are predict-
able, e.g., mechanical as opposed to chemical arts, a broad claim
can be enabled by disclosure of a single embodiment, and is not
invalid for lack of enablement simply because it reads on an-
other embodiment of the invention which is inadequately
disclosed.7 9
Unlike the full scope rule, this test does not require enablement of all
operable embodiments in the predictable arts. It also differs from the
single embodiment rule in two respects. First, it is limited to the predict-
able arts. Second, Spectra-Physics is permissive; it provides that a single
embodiment can enable a broad claim, unlike Engel's single embodi-
ment rule under which a claim is per se enabled by one embodiment.
In a footnote, the Spectra-Physics court claims that this articulation
is the logical implication of having a separate best mode requirement
"which contemplates that the specification can enable one to make and
use the invention and still not disclose a single preferred embodiment."8°
However, this "logical implication" appears to be based on a faulty as-
sumption. The best mode requirement of § 112 requires a patent
applicant to disclose what she believes is the best means of practicing
her invention, that is, her preferred embodiment.' Without this require-
ment, an inventor could still enable a PHOSITA to practice the entire
scope of a claim, including the preferred embodiment, while retaining
that embodiment as a trade secret.82 Thus, while a specification may be
enabling though it fails to disclose the best mode, it does not follow that
the undisclosed preferred embodiment is not enabled. The Spectra-
Physics decision errs by conflating disclosure (that is, revelation) of the
best mode and enablement thereof, thereby creating a distinct-and rela-
tively relaxed-articulation of the enablement standard.
II. CAN THE DIVERGENT ARTICULATIONS BE RECONCILED?
In the wake of Liebel-Flarsheim and its progeny, commentators la-
beled the full scope rule-and in particular, its application in the
predictable arts-as a "new enablement standard" that "vitiates old
79. Spectra-Physics, 827 F.2d at 1533 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
80. Id. at 1533 n.5.
81. See Bayer AG v. Schein Pharm., Inc., 301 F.3d 1306, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
82. See hi re Gay, 309 F.2d 769, 772 (C.C.P.A. 1962). For example, consider a hypo-
thetical inventor of the incandescent light bulb. She could satisfy the enablement requirement
without revealing her preferred filament material, so long as the PHOSITA could discover
how to make and use a bulb with that type of filament without undue experimentation.
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doctrines ''" 3 and makes it "significantly easier for defendants to raise a
lack of enablement defense." This section defends the full scope rule as
consistent with traditional enablement doctrine, including the so-called
single embodiment rule, and suggests a framework with which the Fed-
eral Circuit can unify its seemingly inconsistent standards. Section A
outlines a theory of "thing construction" that accounts for why courts
find that some improvers literally infringe while others escape the reach
of literal claim scope. Section B explains how this theory reconciles the
full scope rule with the bulk of prior enablement doctrine and how the
Federal Circuit can unify its seemingly divergent tests.
A. Thing Construction and Its Effect on the Reach of
Literal Claim Scope
1. An Introduction to Thing Construction
A patentee's right to exclude is defined by what she claims and not
by what she designed or disclosed.8' This feature is known as the periph-
eral claiming approach because the words of a claim form a "conceptual
fence ' 6 that marks the outer boundaries of the patentee's rights . Pe-
ripheral claims are often likened to the "metes and bounds" of a real
property deed, setting out the perimeter of the patentee's rights.88 But this
analogy is misleading. The metes and bounds of a property deed specify
the location of a spatial boundary and therefore demarcate a fixed set of
propertized physical entities. 9 Conversely, peripheral patent claims iden-
tify conceptual subgenera or "thing-types"'  instead of particular
83. Seymore, supra note 41, at 292.
84. Chao, supra note 18, at T 33.
85. Or as Judge Rich, the author of the 1952 Patent Act, put it, "the name of the game is
the claim." Giles S. Rich, Extent of the Protection and Interpretation of Claims-American
Perspectives, 21 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 497, 499 (1990).
86. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent
Claim Construction, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1743, 1744 (2009) (comparing peripheral claiming to
central claiming) (internal quotations omitted).
87. Until 1870, the U.S. patent system used a central claiming approach. Under a cen-
tral claiming regime, the patentee discloses the essential features of the invention that
distinguish it from the prior art, and a court determines claim scope on a case-by-case basis by
comparing the invention to the accused device. Id. at 1746.
88. See, e.g., Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 510
(1917); CAE Screenplates, Inc. v. Heinrich Fiedler GmbH & Co. KG, 224 F.3d 1308, 1319
(Fed. Cir. 2000).
89. See Kevin Emerson Collins, The Reach of Literal Claim Scope into After-Arising
Technology: On Thing Construction and the Meaning of Meaning, 41 CONN. L. REV. 493, 554
n.233 (2006).
90. I borrow this terminology from Collins. See id.
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physical entities. 9' Unlike physical entities, thing-types are merely ab-
stractions, and any given thing-type contains an infinite range of physical
embodiments. Thus, peripheral claim scope contains an array of thing-
type subgenera that are encompassed by the claim.
Since these thing-types are merely conceptual entities, they do not
• 92
have "fully formed, objective existences" before claim construction.
Courts determine the subgenera within a patent claim "when they cate-
gorize the infinite array of infringing [physical embodiments] into the
discrete conceptual baskets, i.e. thing-types, that are tallied to determine
the claim's thing-scope."" Collins terms this process "thing construc-
tion."9 4 In other words, thing construction is "the identification of the
subset of" properties belonging to the array of embodiments
encompassed by the claim "that are relevant to the identities of the tal-
lied thing-types."9 - Suppose, for example, that our hypothetical inventor
claimed the incandescent light bulb. Assume that her specification dis-
closed embodiments of the incandescent bulb with an assortment of
properties, including those with filaments made from carbonized paper
and those made from wood carbon, and incandescent bulbs inside of a
light fixture.' 6 By engaging in thing construction, courts decide which
properties of an allegedly infringing technology are relevant to defining
thing-type subgenera. For instance, one court may treat all types of in-
candescent bulbs, regardless of their filament material, as a single genus.
Such a thing construction overlooks the property of having a specific
filament material; accordingly, incandescent bulbs with the property of
91. But one might argue that the scope of central claims is more concerned with par-
ticular physical embodiments, namely, devices that are found to be infringing.
92. Collins, supra note 89, at 514.
93. Id. at 516.
94. Id.
95. Id. Collins explains that this type of categorization is distinct from that involved in
claim construction and literal infringement:
[Claim construction and literal infringement] start with a category defined by the
claim language and query what belongs in the category by identifying the criteria
needed for inclusion in the category (claim construction) and determining whether a
given [embodiment] satisfies those criteria (literal infringement). The construction
of things, however, runs the categorization process in reverse. Given a set of in-
fringing technologies, what are the categories that one should create in order to
house them? Although the claim language determines the extent of the group of in-
fringing things that must be categorized, it does not provide the criteria that define
the conceptual [subgenera] baskets into which those infringing things should be
sorted.
Id. at 516 n.82.
96. This hypothetical is loosely based on the storied case of the Incandescent Lamp
Patent, 159 U.S. 465 (1895), and is influenced by the work of Kevin Collins. See generally
Collins, supra note 89.
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having a carbonized paper filament are put in the same thing-type basket
as those having a wood carbon filament. A second court may see things
differently and consider the property of having a specific filament mate-
rial in constructing thing-types. Accordingly, this court would treat
incandescent bulbs with different filament materials as discrete thing-
types.
Disparities in thing construction are not without consequence. In the
case of allegedly infringing improvements, a court's approach to thing
construction determines whether literal claim scope can stay fixed in
some sense at the time of filing97 even as it grows, in another sense, to
encompass improvements. This relationship between thing construction
and the reach of literal claim scope follows from the nature of improve-
ments. Improvements are so named because the improver invents a new
property or set of properties for a thing that has already been invented. 98
For example, an allegedly infringing light bulb may be an improvement
because the bulb has the property of having a newly-discovered carbon-
ized bamboo filament that allows it to burn for much longer. When
improvements are framed in terms of newly-invented (or newly-
discovered) properties for preexisting things, it becomes clear that thing
construction can conceal the post-filing growth in literal scope that is
required for a claim to encompass later-developed technology; a court
need only engage in a manner of thing construction that overlooks the
newly-invented property that marks the improvement as later-
developed."
97. According to traditional fixation theory, the law of claim construction and § 112
disclosure doctrines require that claim scope remains fixed in some sense at the time of filing;
in other words, it is impossible for literal claim scope to encompass technologies not known
by the PHOSITA at the time application was filed because a patentee cannot enable technolo-
gies that are not in existence. See Christopher A. Cotropia, "After-Arising" Technologies and
Tailoring Patent Scope, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 151, 167-68 (2005) (subscribing to
fixation theory and concluding that literal claim scope cannot reach after-arising technology).
In contrast, growth :heory posits that the patentee need only enable the scope of the claim as it
would be understood at the time of filing; afterwards, claim scope can grow to encompass
later-developed technologies. See Mark A. Lemley, The Changing Meaning of Patent Claim
Terms, 104 MICH. L. REV. 101, 109 (2005) (explaining how courts allow claims to capture
later-developed technology by construing claims as of the time of infringement). The discus-
sion in this section presumes that courts employ a variant of the fixation theory under which
the meaning of claims is fixed in some sense at the time of filing yet grows, in another sense,
to encompass improvements.
98. The improver could also discover a novel way of applying existing properties to a
thing that another has previously invented.
99. See Collins, supra note 89, at 518. This elimination "renders the after-arising
property irrelevant to the identity of thing-types and the distinctions between them. When the
after-arising property is not a definitional property of the tallied thing-types, the allegedly
infringing [improvement] can be thrown into a preexisting conceptual thing-type basket cre-
ated for the constructively disclosed [i.e., enabled,] embodiments." Id.
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The two courts from the incandescent light bulb hypothetical dem-
onstrate this phenomenon. The first court ignored differences in filament
material and grouped both bulbs with carbonized paper filaments and
those with wood carbon filaments into the same thing-type subgenus.
The second court, however, treated bulbs with different filament material
as distinct thing-types. If the allegedly infringing improvement is a light
bulb with a later-discovered carbonized bamboo filament, then the man-
ner of thing-construction determines whether the claim scope can remain
fixed as of filing but still encompass the improvement. Since the first
court overlooked differences in filament material, that property is irrele-
vant to the identity of any particular thing-type subgenus. Thus, the
carbonized bamboo embodiment would be grouped into the same
subgenus in which both the carbonized paper and the wood carbon em-
bodiments were categorized. The later-developed technology is therefore
treated as the same "type of thing" that was enabled by the specification.
As a result, the first court should find that the bulb with the later-
discovered filament is within the literal scope of the original claim and
that the claim is enabled. In contrast, the second court should either find
that the carbonized bamboo embodiment falls outside of the literal claim
scope or that the claim is not enabled. The second court's thing construc-
tion included discrete thing-type subgenera for different types of
filaments, such as a carbonized-paper-filament subgenus and a wood-
carbon-filament subgenus. The bulb with a carbonized bamboo filament,
however, is an embodiment of a distinct subgenus that could not have
been enabled by the original specification.' °° Since the carbonized bam-
boo embodiment does not fall within a contemplated thing-type, the
original claim is either invalid for lack of enablement or there is no lit-
eral infringement.
Thing construction is similarly determinative of whether the literal
scope of the incandescent light bulb claim can reach an incandescent
street lamp. Here, the relevant property is being housed in a street lamp
light fixture instead of having a newly-discovered carbonized bamboo
filament. The outcome depends on whether the court treats incandescent
bulbs inside and outside of street lamp light fixtures as distinct when
identifying the thing-type subgenera that it tallies to measure claim
scope. As a general matter, the more subgenera the court identifies dur-
ing thing construction-that is, the fewer properties it "overlooks"-the
less likely it is that literal claim scope will reach later-developed tech-
nologies.
100. This assumes, of course, that the carbonized bamboo embodiment could not have
been discovered without undue experimentation.
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2. The Distinction Between Intrinsic and Extrinsic Properties
The Patent Act does not indicate how courts should construct things.
Therefore, whether some properties, but not others, are overlooked is
completely up to the judiciary. Though there are no strict rules, courts
appear to adhere to at least some guiding principles. One such principle
is the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties of things.'0 '
a. Introducing Intrinsic and Extrinsic Properties
Intrinsic properties are those that are "wound up with making the
thing that it is.' ' 0 2 That is, an intrinsic property is "a property that a thing
has (or lacks) regardless of what may be going on outside of itself,"'0'
i.e., "a property that the object has by virtue of itself, depending on no
other thing."' ° Mass, size, shape, and internal structure are convention-
ally understood to be intrinsic properties.' 9 Thus, that a particular light
bulb is round, that it is five inches tall, and that it has a tungsten filament
are intrinsic properties; these properties cannot be changed without
changing the light bulb itself.
In contrast, extrinsic properties are those that are not tied up with the
identity of a thing. Instead, they "are dependent upon the context of the
[object] or its relationships to things other than" the object in question.
In other words, extrinsic properties of an object are those that are "not
entirely about" that object and "depend, wholly or partly, on something
else."'0 7 Thus, the property of being housed in a street lamp light fixture
is an extrinsic property of a light bulb, because it is dependent on the
spatial relationship between the bulb and a separate object, the lamp fix-
ture.
Since improvements are essentially new properties for earlier
inventions,' 8 improvements can be lumped into two categories: (1) in-
trinsic-property improvements, which "result from the invention of a
101. This subsection briefly introduces this distinction and explains how it appears to
govern the reach of literal claim scope into some types of improvements but not others. For a
more detailed analysis of this distinction and its effect on the reach of literal claim scope to
later-developed technologies, see Collins, supra note 89, at 521.
102. Id.
103. Stephen Yablo, Intrinsicness, 26 PHIL. Topics 479 (1999).
104. Michael J. Dunn, Relevant Predication 2: Intrinsic Properties and Internal
Relations, 60 PHIL. STUD. 177, 178 (1990).
105. See Brian Weatherson, Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Properties, See Brian Weatherson,
Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Properties STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, Jan 5, 2002,
hup:/plato.stanford.edulenties/intrinsic-extrinsic/ (mass and shape); David Lewis, Extrinsic
Properties, 44 PHIL. STUD. 197 (1983) (internal structure).
106. Collins, supra note 89, at 522.
107. Lewis, supra note 105, at 197.
108. See supra note 98 and accompanying text ("[An] improver invents a new property
or set of properties for a thing that has already been invented.").
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new intrinsic property" for a previously patented invention; and (2) ex-
trinsic-property improvements-those that result from the invention of a
new extrinsic property for a previously patented invention.' °  The alleg-
edly infringing incandescent light bulb having a newly-discovered
carbonized bamboo filament can be seen as an intrinsic-property im-
provement because it represents a change in the internal structure of the
original incandescent bulb by replacing the filament with a different
material. On the other hand, the incandescent street lamp is an extrinsic-
property improvement because the property of being housed in a street
lamp fixture does nothing to change the previously invented light bulb
itself.
b. How Does the Distinction Affect the Reach of
Literal Claim Scope into Improvements?
Courts appear to routinely allow literal claim scope to reach extrin-
sic-property improvements. Consider the three classic forms of extrinsic-
property improvements: (1) claims to combinations; (2) claims to new
methods of making a previously claimed invention; and (3) claims to
new uses of already claimed inventions. Prior to the advent of the full
scope rule, courts routinely allowed literal claim scope to reach these
types of improvements. That combinations infringe is inherent in the
black letter law of infringement. " Moreover, courts are not concerned
with whether the patentee enabled every method of making or using an
invention. Indeed, this is the approach endorsed by the so-called "single
embodiment" rule under which the enablement requirement is met "if
the description enables any mode of making and using the claimed in-
vention.""' This rule contemplates that when an allegedly infringing
improver makes something with the same intrinsic properties as that
which was enabled by the patentee, new extrinsic properties-such as
being made by a later-developed process-are irrelevant.
Take, for example, the facts of !nvitrogen."2 There, defendant Clo-
netech argued that because Invitrogen's disclosure only enabled the
PHOSITA to make the claimed RT using deletion mutation, RT made by
the later-developed point mutation technique was not enabled. Clonetech
109. I borrow this terminology from Collins, supra note 89, at 527.
110. See A.B. Dick Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 713 F.2d 700, 703 (Fed. Cir. 1983) ("It is
fundamental that one cannot avoid infringement merely by adding elements if each element
recited in the claims is found in the accused device. For example, a pencil structurally infring-
ing a patent claim would not become noninfringing when incorporated into a complex
machine that limits or controls what the pencil can write.") (citations omitted).
Ill. Engel Indus., Inc. v. Lockformer Co., 946 F.2d 1528, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (em-
phasis added).
112. See supra Part I.C.2.
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did not contend that its point-mutated RT embodiment was somehow
intrinsically different than Invitrogen's RT; the defendant merely claimed
to produce an extrinsic-property improvement. Reciting the "single em-
bodiment" rule, the court held that Invitrogen's claim was enabled
because disclosure of just one means for producing RT was sufficient.
Thus, the court overlooked the property that made Clonetech's RT an
"improvement"- having been made with the later-developed point mu-
tation technique-and thereby allowed the claim's literal scope to reach
Clonetech's embodiment.
The rationale behind decisions like Invitrogen is intuitive. Why
should we allow those who make products which are intrinsically identi-
cal to a claimed invention escape infringement by merely placing that
invention in a different context (in the case of combinations) or by using
a different method to produce that invention? If this were allowed, the
discovery of new combinations or ways of producing (or using) inven-
tions would often render claims worthless. Discoveries of new methods
with widespread application, such as point mutation, would effectively
terminate all claims drawn to inventions that were previously made using
a comparatively traditional method, such as deletion mutation.
B. Reconciling the Full Scope Rule with Preexisting Doctrine
As we have seen, labeling the language from Engel"3 a "single em-
bodiment" rule is rather misdescriptive. Contrary to commentators'
assertions, '4 the Engel rule never meant that enablement of a single em-
bodiment is sufficient to enable a broader claim. It merely meant that
enabling one mode, method, or means of producing and using the scope
of the invention is sufficient; in other words, it is irrelevant whether the
specification enables the PHOSITA to practice alternate methods of
making or using the invention so long as the alternate method produces
an object that is intrinsically the same as a well-enabled embodiment.
This issue was highlighted in the cases discussed earlier, where each of
the so-called "single embodiment" decisions rejected a defendant's ar-
gument that the patentee needed to enable an alternate method of
producing a claimed entity."' Yet in none of these decisions did the court
113. Engel, 946 F.2d at 1533 ("The enablement requirement is met if the description
enables any mode of making and using the claimed invention.") (emphasis added).
114. See, e.g., Chao, supra note 18, at 1 50 (concluding that Engel held that "enabling
any embodiment satisfies the enablement requirement regardless of the breadth of the
claims"); Seymore, supra note 41, at 284.
115. See supra Part I.C.2. This claim ignores the failure of the CellPro court to consider
CellPro's first contention that a subgenus of antibodies-which was intrinsically distinct from
the well-enabled preferred antibody-was not enabled. See supra note 53 and accompanying
text.
Pioneers Versus Improvers
hold that enabling just one embodiment is sufficient. The Engel rule
merely requires that courts overlook the extrinsic properties of being
made by an alternate process" and being used for an alternate purpose
during thing construction.
How then does the Engel rule differ from the full scope rule? That
depends on what the Federal Circuit means by "full scope." The court
has not expressly defined "full scope." When it introduced the rule in AK
Steel, it mentioned only that Section 112 requires "reasonable enable-
ment,""' and that failure to enable "a significant portion of the subject
matter encompassed" by the claim renders the claim invalid.' 8 Despite
commentators' claims to the contrary," 9 the Federal Circuit's full scope
decisions do not vitiate the Engel rule. In fact, none of these decisions
even considered whether a claim was invalid for failure to disclose an
alternate method of making or using the claimed invention. 120
In contrast, each of the full scope decisions invalidated claims for
failure to enable claimed embodiments with intrinsic properties that dif-
fered from those of well-enabled embodiments, much like carbonized
bamboo filament embodiment in the light bulb hypothetical. For exam-
ple, in Liebel-Flarsheim, Liebel's claims were drawn to a fluid injector
system with a replaceable syringe capable of withstanding high pressure.
The specification disclosed an injector with a pressure jacket. At Liebel's
behest, however, the claims were construed to include both jacketed and
jacketless injectors despite the fact that the inventor tried and failed to
produce a jacketless system. The defendant, Medrad, improved upon the
patentee's design by creating an injector system that worked without a
pressure jacket. Like the carbonized bamboo filament embodiment,
Medrad's embodiment was an intrinsic-property improvement; it dif-
fered from Liebel's product because it possessed the intrinsic property of
having no pressure jacket. Liebel's claim was invalidated for failure to
enable jacketless embodiments. Because the allegedly infringing device
116. This analysis, of course, does not apply to method claims. Where the invention is
itself a process, that process is an intrinsic property of the invention. Consequently, altemate
processes would constitute intrinsic-property improvements and would therefore exceed the
scope of the claimed invention.
117. AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac, 344 F.3d 1234, 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
118. Id. at 1245.
119. See, e.g., Seymore, supra note 41, at 292 (calling the full scope rule a "new en-
ablement standard" that "vitiates old doctrines").
120. In AK Steel, the claim was invalidated for lack of enablement because the specifica-
tion "expressly [taught] against" a claimed embodiment. 344 F.3d at 1244. In Sitrick, the
claims were drawn to integration of a user-added audio and video signals to a preexisting
video game or movie. The claims were invalidated because the specification did not enable the
PHOSITA to practice the invention with movies. Sitrick v. Dreamworks, L.L.C., 516 E3d 993,
1000 (Fed. Cir. 2008). For a discussion of the Federal Circuit's reasoning in Liebel-
Flarscheim, see supra Part I.C. I.
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was an intrinsic-property improvement, the Engel rule simply did not
apply.
Although the full scope decisions did not analyze, and therefore
could not have rejected, the Engel rule, one could still make the case that
the rules are incompatible. 2 ' After all, requiring enablement of the full
scope of claims implies that every conceivable embodiment must be en-
abled, including extrinsic-property improvements. Under such an
interpretation, however, literal claim scope could not reach either the
incandescent street lamp improvement or Clonetech's point-mutated RT;
for the reasons described above, the invention of new combinations or
ways of producing or using inventions would therefore render many
claims worthless.' 2 2 More importantly, this interpretation would run afoul
of well-established principles of literal infringement that treat combina-
tion-improvements as infringements. 2  It is inconceivable that the
Federal Circuit would have intended such an absurd result.
Therefore, the full scope rule is best understood as requiring en-
ablement of the full scope of a claim subject to the Engel rule. This
understanding of the full scope rule and the inaptly named "single em-
bodiment" rule resolves their apparent conflict and is consistent with
longstanding rules of enablement and literal infringement. 
24
III. THE PROPOSED FRAMEWORK
As we saw in Part I, the advent of the full scope rule has lead com-
mentators to identify as many as three separate rules for enablement.
These commentators characterize the full scope rule as "a fundamen-
tally different approach"'2 1 from that of Engel and recommend a
121. The Automotive Technologies court did reject ATI's argument that adequate disclo-
sure of a single embodiment, i.e., mechanical side impact sensors, was sufficient to enable
ATI's claims encompassing electronic sensors. See Auto. Technologies Int'l, Inc. v. BMW of
N. Am., Inc., 501 F.3d 1274, 1285 (Fed. Cir. 2007). This was not, however, a rejection of the
Engel rule, which applies to extrinsic properties. Rather, ATI sought to improperly extend the
Engel rule to an intrinsic property: the structure of the sensor.
122. See supra Part II.A.2. See Lefstin, supra note 63 at 1173.
123. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
124. Admittedly, this approach does not reconcile the Spectra-Physics rule, which states
that a claim "is not invalid for lack of enablement simply because it reads on another embodi-
ment of the invention which is inadequately disclosed." Spectra-Physics, Inc., v. Coherent,
Inc., 827 F.2d 1524, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1987). The Spectra-Physics rule, however, may have
resulted from the court's conflation of the best mode and enablement requirements. See supra
Part I.C.3.
125. Chao, supra note 18, at I 49. See Seymore, supra note 41, at 280-84 (contrasting
the full scope and single embodiment rules).
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retreat 26 from the new rule. Part II concluded that critics of the full
scope rule misinterpret the Engel rule. Properly understood, the Engel
rule is compatible with the full scope rule, and together, the rules are
consistent with well-established principles of enablement and literal in-
fringement.
In light of this new understanding of the Engel and full scope rules,
this Part contains four related proposals. First, the Federal Circuit should
resolve the apparent conflict between its enablement tests by unifying
the full scope and Engel rules. In doing so, it should clear up any ambi-
guities created by its full scope decisions. Second, the court should
reemphasize the role of the PHOSITA and contemplate mandating con-
sideration of the Wands factors. Third, the court should revive its practice
of construing claims to preserve their validity. Finally, the Federal Cir-
cuit should provide guidance on whether literal claim scope can reach
intrinsic-property improvements, and if so, in what cases.
A. Resolve the Apparent Conflict Between the Enablement Tests
and Clarify Any Ambiguities About the Full Scope Rule
As a first step, the Federal Circuit should dispel any notion that there
exists a "single embodiment" test. It should explicitly reject the misin-
terpretation of Engel that maintains "enabling any embodiment satisfies
the enablement requirement regardless of the breadth of the claims.'' 2'
Next, the court should explain the true meaning of the Engel rule: a pat-
entee need not enable alternate means for producing or using the claimed
invention. To make this point clear, it should also explain the work done
by the Engel rule, namely, that it prevents those who make products in-
trinsically identical to those enabled by the specification from escaping
infringement merely by using a different method to produce the claimed
invention.'28 Finally, the Federal Circuit should unify the full scope and
Engel rules by articulating the following joint rule: the enablement re-
quirement is met if the specification teaches the PHOSITA how to make
and use the full scope of the claimed invention without undue experimen-
tation, except that alternate methods of making or using the claimed
invention need not be enabled. "9
In addition, the Federal Circuit should clarify any uncertainties cre-
ated by its recent full scope decisions. In particular, it should reconsider
126. See Chao, supra note 18, at 3 (recommending that the Federal Circuit "take a step
back from the full scope rule and return to the principles set forth in its earlier decisions").
127. Id. at 150.
128. See supra Part I.C.2.
129. The court could be even more explicit by explaining that the Engel rule applies only
in cases where the alternate method produces entities that have the same intrinsic properties as
that which was enabled by the patentee. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
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its application of the "novel aspect" requirement in Automotive Tech-
nologies International, Inc. v. BMW of North America, Inc.'3 ° In
Automotive Technologies, the claimed invention was an automotive side
impact velocity-type sensor used to trigger an airbag. At the behest of
the patentee (ATI) the district court construed its claims to include both
mechanical and electronic side impact sensors.'3 ' On summary judgment,
however, the trial court held that ATI's patent was invalid for lack of en-
ablement because it failed to provide sufficient details to teach a skilled
artisan how to make and use an electronic sensor.'32 On appeal, ATI ar-
gued that despite its limited disclosure, "the knowledge of one skilled in
the art was sufficient to supply the missing information." The Federal
Circuit disagreed, holding that the specification, and not the PHOSITA's
knowledge of art, must supply the "novel aspects" of the invention.'33
It makes sense to require that the specification provide the novel as-
pects of an invention; after all, if the purported "novel aspects" of the
invention existed in the prior art, they would be conventional-not novel.
The Federal Circuit, however, mistakenly narrowed its inquiry to
whether the portion of the specification dedicated to describing the elec-
tronic embodiment provided the novel aspects, as if it were isolated from
the rest of the specification. In its analysis, the court acknowledged that
the portion of the specification that disclosed the mechanical embodi-
ment provided the novel aspect of the invention, namely, the use of
"inertial or acceleration sensors to sense side impacts."'' 34 Yet the court
strangely refused to consider the proper inquiry: whether the PHOSITA,
equipped with the copious description of the mechanical embodiment-
which disclosed the novel aspects-and the prior art, could adapt an
electronic embodiment without undue experimentation. Enablement as-
sesses whether the entire specification teaches the PHOSITA how to
make and use the claimed invention without undue experimentation, not
whether the portion of the specification dedicated to a particular em-
bodiment, in isolation, enables that embodiment. '
130. 501 F.3d 1274, 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
131. Id. at 1278.
132. Id. at 1280.
133. Id. at 1283.
134. Id.
135. Had the court engaged in the proper inquiry, it most likely would have ruled in
ATI's favor. Recall that ATI appealed a district court's grant of summary judgment of non-
enablement; thus, ATI merely needed to raise a genuine issue of material fact to overcome that
ruling. The testimony of ATi's expert seemingly raised numerous genuine and material issues
of fact regarding whether the PHOSITA could adapt an electronic sensor without undue ex-
perimentation. The expert claimed that: (I) the PHOSITA would know how to adapt then-
existing technology to create an electronic side impact sensor; (2) electronic sensors were
commercially available before the filing date; (3) based on engineering texts in 1989, one
would have known how to select a commercial accelerometer, how to use analog circuits, and
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By unduly restricting its novel aspect inquiry to the portion of the
specification that described the embodiment in question, the Automotive
Technologies decision effectively strengthened the enablement require-
ment. This strengthening, however, is not justified because the PHOSITA
has the entire specification at her disposal. Therefore, the Federal Circuit
should overrule this overly restrictive approach to the novel aspect in-
quiry.
B. Reemphasize the Role of the PHOSITA and Consider
Mandating the Wands Factors
The Federal Circuit should also harness the patent bar's renewed fo-
cus on the enablement doctrine by reemphasizing the central role of the
PHOSITA in enablement. The enablement inquiry often turns on
whether the PHOSITA's knowledge of the art and routine experimenta-
tion can "fill in the gaps" and allow him to practice a claimed
embodiment that was not disclosed.136 Thus assessments of the
PHOSITA's knowledge, his level of skill, and the point at which he con-
siders experimentation to be undue can be dispositive of whether a claim
is enabled. Consequently, to improve the chances that enablement
achieves its policy objectives, courts should conduct a thorough factual
inquiry to determine the skills and/or qualifications of the person of
ordinary skill in the (narrow) field to which the particular invention per-
tains.
To this end, the Federal Circuit should recalibrate its view of the
PHOSITA. Commentators have indicated that the Federal Circuit has a
flawed conception of both the skill of the PHOSITA and the predictabil-
ity of the art; it tends to underestimate the difficulty of writing
software'37 but thinks that all of biotechnology is "incredibly unpredict-
able."'3 8 The problem stems from hindsight bias and reliance on
industry-specific precedent rather than the particulars of each case,
how to program and interface a microprocessor to process the signal using the existing prior
art. Id. at 1284. Each of these statements appears to create a genuine and material issue of fact.
136. See Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 481 F.3d 1371, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
("[Tlhe specification need not necessarily describe how to make and use every embodiment of
the invention because the artisan's knowledge of the prior art and routine experimentation can
often fill in the gaps."). For instance, would the PHOSITA's knowledge of how to adapt then-
existing technology to create an electronic side impact sensor allow him to practice the elec-
tronic embodiment with only routine experimentation?
137. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 20, at 1199-1200.
138. Competition and Intellectual Property Law and Policy in the Knowledge-Based
Economy: Hearings Before the Fed. Trade Conm 'n on Economic and Other Perspectives on
Patent Standards and Procedures 106 (Apr. 10, 2002) [hereinafter Hearings Before the FTC
on Patent Standards] (statement of Arti K. Rai, Professor of Law).
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which leads to dated views of the PHOSITA's level of skill. 39 As others
have noted, "hindsight bias risks infecting the PHOSITA analysis" and
will "normally lead factfinders to overestimate the level of skill in the
art," especially in technologies easily understood by the factfinder.,4° But
in other cases, hindsight bias could have the reverse effect, "notably
where certain things known or believed at one time to be feasible turn
out later to be more difficult than anticipated." 4' Thus, to avoid contami-
nating the enablement test, courts should delve into a fact-intensive
inquiry to determine the appropriate PHOSITA in each case.'4 2 Similarly,
courts should make case-by-case determinations of the predictability of
the narrow field in question. 4 3 Indeed, the same could be said for all fac-
tual questions relevant to enablement, for instance, what separates
routine testing from undue experimentation? Because these factual in-
quiries are important for enablement, and hence, claim scope, mandating
bona fide consideration of each Wands factor should promote a better
balance between incentivizing first-generation inventions and improve-
ments.'"4
C. Revive the Maxim that Claims Should Be Construed
to Preserve Validity
Third, the Federal Circuit should return to its practice of construing
claims to preserve their validity.' 45 Invalidating a patent for lack of en-
139. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 20, at 1201.
140. Id. at 1199.
141. Id.
142. See id. at 1202 (calling on courts to indentify the PHOSITA "anew in each case"
and "spend more time and effort fleshing out the PHOSITA").
143. Cf. Competition and Intellectual Property Law and Policy in the Knowledge-Based
Economy: Hearings Before the Fed. Trade Comm 'n on Patent Law Analysis in Federal Circuit
Jurisprudence 198-99 (July 10, 2002) (statement of Dan L. Burk, Professor, University of
Minnesota Law School) (explaining that courts have not accounted for the growing predict-
ability of some biotech techniques); id. at 192-93 (statement of Stephen G. Kunin, Deputy
Comm'r for Patent Examination Policy, U.S. Patent and Trademark Office) (suggesting that
the increasing complexity of software inventions of software inventions may have reduced
predictability).
144. Hearings Before the FTC on Patent Standards, supra note 138, at 118-19 (state-
ment of Mark D. Janis, Professor of Law) (claiming that the enablement standard for software
could be made "much more rigorous with good effect"); Burk & Lemley, supra note 20, at
1196 (suggesting that innovation in the software industry may benefit from a heightened en-
ablement standard that would lead to narrower patents). To the extent this proposal focuses
more on the PHOSITA, it allows for a more industry-specific enablement analysis, which
could be used as a policy lever. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 16, at 1649 ("The PHOSITA is
... central to calibrating the legal standard for patent disclosure.").
145. In Klein v. Russell, the Supreme Court introduced the canon of claim construction
that, when possible, claims should be construed to preserve their validity. 86 U.S. 433, 466
(1873). This cannon of claim construction, however, has subsequently fallen out of favor. In
Phillips v. AWH Corp., the Federal Circuit, sitting en banc, acknowledged "that claims should
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ablement may be a harsh result in some cases. Identifying all the em-
bodiments that fall within claims can be a difficult-and at times, a
seemingly Sisyphean-task. Indeed, prior to claim construction, it may
be difficult for anybody to determine the precise scope of claims.' 6 To
soften the patentee's burden, defendants could be required to raise their
enablement challenges during claim construction. With this information,
courts could construe claims so that their full scope is enabled by nar-
rowing them when a. 14
Recall the facts of Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc. 4 8 Defendant
Medrad challenged Liebel's proposed claim construction for failure to
enable a jacketless injector system. This construction was necessary to
capture Medrad's product, which worked without a pressure jacket. De-
spite its awareness of Medrad's enablement challenge, Liebel pursued
the broader construction; thus, the court had little sympathy for Liebel
when its claim was invalidated for lack of enablement. By requiring de-
fendants to raise enablement challenges during claim construction, this
proposal would put all plaintiffs on notice of potentially overbroad
claims. Thus, the plaintiff would have the opportunity to narrow scope
during claim construction or take its chances at showing that the chal-
lenged embodiment is indeed enabled.'4 9 This regime would therefore
provide a means for courts to tailor a claim to its proper scope rather
than having to invalidate the entire claim. Without this mechanism,
be construed to preserve their validity," but reserved the principle for cases in which "the court
concludes, after applying all the available tools of claim construction, that the claim is still
ambiguous." 415 F.3d 1303, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Thus, the maxim essentially serves only as
a tie-breaker.
146. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 86, at 1745 (describing the inherent indeterminacy
of claim construction: "it may simply be impossible to cleanly map words to things") (citing
BERTRAND RUSSELL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LOGICAL ATOMISM 38 (David Pears ed., Open
Court 1985) ("Everything is vague to a degree you do not realize till you have tried to make it
precise.")).
147. Dan Burk and Mark Lemley appear to support this idea, albeit, not in this particular
form. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 86, at 1797 (suggesting that "[clourts should be willing
in appropriate cases to disregard claim language that doesn't seem to accurately capture what
the patentee invented, rather than being prisoners to that language even when it subverts the
intent of the patent."). Of course, there must be some limit to this practice. To borrow a rule
from the doctrine of equivalents, a claim should not be construed in a manner that vitiates its
plain meaning. Suppose a claim read:
Composition X produced either by method I or 2.
That claim could not subsequently be construed to mean "Composition X produced only by
method ."
148. 481 F.3d 1373, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2007). See supra Part I.C. I (discussing the pertinent
facts of the case).
149. Even if the patentee chooses to gamble, the odds are-in a sense-in her favor.
Because all patents are afforded a statutory presumption of validity, the defendant bears the
burden of proving invalidity by clear and convincing evidence.
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courts may well be reluctant to faithfully apply the enablement standard
because of the instinctive injustice of leaving the patentee empty-handed.
Admittedly, a strictly applied enablement test would weaken ex ante in-
centives to the extent that it rendered more claims invalid; however, the
opportunity to narrow claims while preserving at least part of their scope
should reduce this effect. The harm to incentives for first-developers
seems to be overshadowed by the benefit of increasing incentives for
follow on innovation.'
5 0
In addition, the proposed regime would largely resolve the concern
that the full scope rule indiscriminately benefits defendants that do not
practice the challenged embodiment.' 5' Such a defendant would have
little to gain because it would still infringe the more-narrowly-construed
claim.' Finally, this regime is consistent with commentary about the
inadequacies of Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") review.'53 With
their limited time and resources, examiners surely cannot consider
whether the infinite embodiments encompassed by a claim are enabled.'54
D. Provide Guidance on Whether Literal Claim Scope Can Reach
Intrinsic-Property Improvements
As discussed above in the examination of thing-construction, courts
generally allow literal claim scope to reach extrinsic-property improve-
150. See supra notes 6-13 and accompanying text (discussing the tradeoff between en-
couraging pioneering inventions and improvements). One may also argue that construing
claims in a manner that radically alters their scope impairs the notice function of patents. The
peripheral claiming regime already fails "catastrophically" in that function, however. See Burk
& Lemley, supra note 86, at 1791.
151. Bernard Chao raises the concern that the full scope rule raises fairness concerns by
allowing defendants that practice enabled embodiments to escape infringement when the
claim also covers non-enabled embodiments. See Chao, supra note 18, at ' 73-75 (identify-
ing the issue and contrasting it with a traditional claim construction dispute).
152. Though, the defendant may improve its bargaining power in settlement talks by
threatening to argue for a narrower construction. Furthermore, if the plaintiff refused to cede
the challenged claim scope-e.g., to preserve its ability to challenge others or the defendant in
the future-the plaintiff risks having the claim invalidated; conversely, the defendant may seek
a narrow construction so that it may freely make the non-enabled embodiment in the future.
This latter result may be desirable, especially if the non-enabled embodiment has yet to be
invented. Under such circumstances, competition and/or the prospect of a patent (assuming
patentability) may encourage creation of the invention.
153. See John R. Thomas, Collusion and Collective Action in the Patent System: A Pro-
posal for Patent Bounties, 2001 U. ILL. L. REv. 305, 316-22; Doug Lichtman & Mark A.
Lemley, Rethinking Patent Law's Presumption of Validity, 60 STAN. L. REv. 45, 47 (2007).
154. A natural question may be: if it is so difficult to identify the embodiments that fall
within a claim's scope, how can the PTO apply enablement doctrine? There is not a good
answer. In addition to the financial and time constraints, PTO examination does not benefit
from the adversarial nature of infringement suits. Without an allegedly infringing device to
consider, an examiner must imagine all the potentially claimed embodiments in the abstract.
In short, the PTO can probably only handle the easy cases, while the hard cases are left up to
courts.
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ments.' 9 Do courts allow literal claim scope to reach intrinsic-property
improvements too? If the answer is yes, then there is no limit on the
reach of literal claim scope into after-arising technology (AAT). If it is
no, then literal claim scope can only reach AAT in the cases described196 157
above. As it turns out, the answer varies from case to case.
Consider the case of In re Hogan.'58 The claims--drawn to solid
polymers of propylene-were originally rejected for lack of enabling
disclosure because, although they were "generic in nature, [the] appli-
cants ... only described a very limited species within the generic
class." '-"9 To support this rejection, the examiner cited several non-
enabled species of amorphous polymers that were developed after the
filing date. The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals reversed, holding
that the later-developed amorphous polymers could not be used to in-
validate the claims."6° The specification did not enable the PHOSITA to
produce amorphous polymers; it only taught one how to make crystalline
polymers. Though the claims were not limited to the disclosed crystal-
line polymers, the patentee's disclosure was deemed sufficient because
crystalline polymers were the only type of polymer in existence as of
filing. The court further suggested that literal claims to pioneering inven-
tions should be able to reach into intrinsic-property after-arising
technologies:
To restrict appellants to the crystalline form disclosed, under
such circumstances, would be a poor way to stimulate invention,
and particularly to encourage its early disclosure. To demand
such restriction is merely to state a policy against broad protec-
363tion for pioneer[ing] inventions ....
155. See supra Part II.A.
156. See supra Part II.A.2.b (discussing circumstances under which literal claim scope
reaches extrinsic-property after-arising technology, such as combinations with later-developed
technologies and embodiments that are made using a later-developed method).
157. As Kevin Collins explains:
[T]he cases in which courts confront allegedly infringing intrinsic-property AAT
are a mixed bag. Adhering to the fixation theory, some courts hold that literal claim
scope cannot encompass intrinsic-property AAT as a matter of law because the
commensurability requirement of the disclosure doctrines fixes claim scope on the
date of filing and the growth required for claim scope to encompass the AAT is in-
compatible with this fixation. Yet, not all courts insist that intrinsic-property AAT
does not literally infringe. Many courts conclude that literal claim scope can en-
compass intrinsic-property AAT.
Collins, supra note 89, at 533.
158. 559 F.2d 595 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
159. Id. at 600.
160. Id. at 605.
161. Id. at 606.
Spring 20 10]
470 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 16:439
In Plant Genetic Systems v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., the Federal Cir-
16'
cuit came to the opposite conclusion. - The patentee's claims were
drawn towards genetically engineered plants that were resistant to cer-
tain herbicides. Such plants were desirable because they "[could] grow
in the presence of the herbicide that kills other unwanted plants or
weeds."'06 The central issue in the case was which types of plants were
covered by the claims. Flowering plants can be broadly classified as ei-
ther monocots or dicots. Because it was not possible as of the filing date
to produce monocots that met the claim limitations, the district court
construed the claims to be limited to dicots.' 6 Thus, the district court
held that DeKalb's transgenic corn products could not infringe the
claims since corn is a monocot165 On appeal, Plant Genetic Systems
(PGS) relied heavily on Hogan in arguing that its literal claims should
reach DeKalb's later-developed transgenic corn. The Federal Circuit re-
jected this argument, explaining that Hogan "cannot be read to assist
improper enforcement against later developers. Hogan simply held that
one could not use a later-existing state of the art to invalidate a patent
that was enabled for what it claimed at the time of filing."' 6 In the eyes
of the court, the reasoning in Hogan simply goes too far, and that deci-
sion's discussion about the reach of literal claims into AAT were nothing
more than "extended dicta."'' 67 Consequently, the Federal Circuit rejected
PGS's attempt to reach DeKalb's AAT and affirmed the district court's
finding of noninfringement.'
68
Though it expressly rejected the dicta of Hogan, Plant Genetics did
not mark the end of courts allowing literal claim scope to reach intrinsic-
property AATs. In SuperGuide Corp. v. DirecTV Enterprises, Inc., the
Federal Circuit held that a claim to systems for receiving "regularly re-
ceived televisions signals" filed in 1985, covered digital television
signals that were "not then in use by the television industry ... much
less described and enabled" in the patent application.'69
The conflict between the majority and dissent in Amgen, Inc. v.
Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc. highlights yet another situation in which
literal claim scope expanded to include intrinsic-property AAT. 7 As pre-
viously mentioned, not all EPO is the same. The defendant's EPO, which
162. 315 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
163. Id. at 1337.
164. Id. at 1338. Therefore, it appears that the district court considered enablement, at
least implicitly, in construing the claims.
165. Id. at 1345.
166. Id. at 1340.
167. Id. at 1341.
168. Id. at 1345-46.
169. 358 F.3d 870, 898 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Michel, J., concurring).
170. 314 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
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was made using a later-developed process, differed from Amgen's EPO
in glycosylation-patterns of branched carbohydrate chains that attach to
the protein.' 7 ' The majority quickly classified the defendant's EPO as an
extrinsic-property AAT with the property of being made by an alternate
process.7 2 Accordingly, the majority applied the Engel rule and thereby
allowed Amgen's literal claim scope to reach the defendant's EPO. How-
ever, the defendant's EPO was also an intrinsic-property AAT with the
property of having distinct patterns of branched carbohydrate chains.
Recognizing this, Judge Clevenger dissented, claiming that the majority
allowed the claim too broad a scope given Amgen's disclosure of only
one species.'
What explains the disparity of outcomes in cases in which literal
claim scope expands to reach intrinsic-property AAT? It could be that
Federal Circuit panels simply cannot agree about whether such expan-
sion should be allowed. A more charitable explanation, however, is that
courts sometimes treat intrinsic-property AAT as extrinsic-property AAT
for policy reasons. 74 For instance, the Amgen, Inc. majority may have
ignored trivial differences in the structure of the parties' EPO because
there was no evidence that differences in glycosylation affect the thera-
peutic efficacy of EPO. Such treatment was necessary to preserve the
policy behind the Engel rule; otherwise, the defendant would have
escaped liability by using an alternate method of production merely be-
cause that method resulted in a trivial difference in an intrinsic property.
The apparent absence of a guiding principle in these cases is
disconcerting. Though having fewer bright line rules can allow for more
policy-driven tailoring, district courts cannot pull policy levers of which
they are not aware. In light of the absence of guiding principles, and the
stifling effects of broad claim scope on the development of improve-
ments, the Federal Circuit should create a presumption that literal claim
scope cannot reach intrinsic-property AAT. Thus, unless the presump-
tion is overcome, courts would follow the Plant Genetics approach. To
overcome the presumption, a patentee could show that the difference in
intrinsic properties is so trivial in terms of the purpose of the claimed
invention that the AAT is akin to an extrinsic-property AAT;
alternatively, a patentee could demonstrate that the distinct intrinsic
property is not central to the claimed invention.
171. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text; Aingen, Inc., 314 F.3d at 1321-22.
172. See Aingen, Inc., 314 F.3d at 1335.
173. Id. at 1360 (Clevenger, J., dissenting).
174. See Collins, supra note 89, at 535-36 (discussing how "courts may use thing con-
struction as a policy lever").
175. The Federal Circuit may want the presumption to arise only when the defendant
objects to the plaintiff's attempt to expand literal claim scope to reach intrinsic-property AAT.
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Moreover, the Federal Circuit may wish to create certain per se ex-
ceptions. For example, it may wish to establish a rule that always allows
the literal claim scope of mechanical inventions to reach allegedly in-
fringing devices made from later-developed materials. In the
pharmaceutical context where prospect theory is more salient, patentees
may be permitted to reach any type of AAT so long as the allegedly in-
fringing AAT is bioequivalent.
CONCLUSION
The enablement requirement is central to striking the optimal bal-
ance between encouraging first-generation inventors and improvers. It is
therefore essential that the Federal Circuit mend the doctrine's current
disarray. Though critics cast the full scope rule as a "new enablement
standard" that "vitiates old doctrines," it is actually entirely consistent
with preexisting doctrine. Contrary to critics' claims, the Engel rule
merely claims that the patentee need not disclose alternate means for
making or using the claimed invention. Accordingly, the Engel rule
works alongside the full scope rule, and together, the rules are consistent
with longstanding principles of enablement and literal infringement. The
Federal Circuit should therefore unify the full scope and Engel rules and
resolve any remaining ambiguities about the full scope rule's applica-
tion.
It is also imperative that the enablement requirement actually oper-
ates in furtherance of its policy objectives. To this end, the Federal
Circuit should reemphasize the role of the PHOSITA and contemplate
mandating consideration of all the Wands factors. Moreover, it should
resurrect the moribund maxim that claims should be construed to
preserve their validity. Finally, the Federal Circuit should implement a
two-tiered approach to after-arising technology, allowing claims to reach
extrinsic-property AAT while presuming that intrinsic-property AAT
falls outside of literal claim scope.
